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UNMET CHALLENGES OF INEQUALITY IN
THE WORLD COMMUNITY *
Cow T. OLIVm t
"[W]e are faced now with a frightful division of the
world . . .,,
The eleven prior lectures in this series have been directed either to
the interest of Justice Roberts in the need for justice and law in our
domestic environment, or to his awareness of the menaces and oppor-
tunities facing all mankind on this small, blue-green-white planet. My
classification shows seven lectures on the first major theme I and four
on the second.' It is appropriate that I attempt to deal with inequality
* This Article was presented as the Owen J. Roberts Memorial Lecture, delivered
April 2, 1970, under the auspices of the Pennsylvania Chapter of the Order of the
Coif and the University of Pennsylvania Law School.
'I Ferdinand Wakeman Hubbell Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania.
B.A. 1933, LL.B. 1936, University of Texas; LL.M. 1953, J.S.D. 1954, Columbia
University. Professor Oliver formerly served as Ambassador to Colombia, Assistant
Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and United States (AID) Coordinator
of the Alliance for Progress, and United States Executive Director of the Inter-
national Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and its affiliates.
I The Rule of Law in the International Community, address by Owen J. Roberts,
Oxford University, Nov. 23, 1951, in FREEDoM & UNION, Jan. 1952, at 26.
2 Devlin, Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1962) ; Frank-
furter, The Supreme Court in the Mirror of the Justices, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 781
(1957) ; Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. Rnv. 631 (1964) ;
Goldberg, Can We Afford Liberty?, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 665 (1969) ; Goodhart, The
Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty, 106 U. PA. L. REv. 943 (1958); Traynor,
The Unguarded Affairs of the Semikempt Mistress, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1965);
Wechsler, Sentencing, Correction, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REv.
465 (1961).
3 Cordier, The Rule of Law in the World Community, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 892
(1963); Eban, Multilateral Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 984
(1966) ; Spaak, Problems Facing the West, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1085 (1959); Wil-
liams, Fundamental Rights and the Prospect for Democracy in Nigeria, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 1073 (1967).
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problems arising outside our borders, rather than with those within,
thus making the count seven to five. Never, however, would I want to
be misunderstood as believing internal and external challenges of in-
equality separable, except in terms of an analyst's competence to discuss
them. I used to think most of us knew they were not.
What about today? Many observers see us as avoiding thought
about indignity, poverty, and injustice abroad. Perhaps it is not neo-
isolationism as much as it is neo-ethnocentrism that leads to so many
evasions, overt and subconscious, of the ever-mounting challenges and
needs of the poorer southern half of the earth. Thus some, influenced
by a remarkable and very puritanical masochism, say that the United
States should withdraw from the external world until it has perfected
itself.4 Others are cautious, even selfish, because by the high standards
of our own society they are insecure or deprived. Many are ready to
give up the thus far short, low-cost (by the standards of our Marshall
Plan reconstruction assistance to developed but devastated countries)
war against poverty and inequality facing the 66 percent of the world's
present population enjoying only 12.5 percent of the "gross world
product." 5 The reasons given run the full range of clichs: "Aid is a
graft-ridden giveaway." "Our assistance to them hasn't made them
love/respect/cooperate with/follow us." "Aid is imperialism."
Of those who are unconcerned with the issue of help to the dis-
advantaged outside our borders, the most appealing-and honest-are
the poor in spirit of our times: those who see no way out of man's tragic
condition. "If the bomb doesn't get you, the environment or the popu-
lation explosion will." Maybe they are right, but I think there is still
a chance. Let us be sure we know what the world situation really is,
and then try-urgently-to help turn it around.
My mission here is not to preach against the decline in the per-
centage of our total national contribution to the moderate alleviation of
the shockingly low quality of life in most of the world. The point is
often made and often ignored.' Rather, in this presentation I seek to
4 This was a major theme of an address by George F. Kennan, Amnerica After
Vietnam, delivered at the Prelude to Independence ceremony, Colonial Williamsburg,
June 1, 1968 (published in pamphlet form).
- COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, PARTNERS IN DEVELOPMENT 24,
chart 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as PEARSON REPORT].
6 1969 was a year of major and minor "assizes" on development assistance, the
merited Grand Assize being the PEARSON REPORT. All called with varying degrees
of specificity for a reversal in the downward trend of United States overall inputs
into "foreign aid." During the same period, to my eye a preponderence of editorial
opinion favored more rather than less aid. From within the Congress, however,
came confusing sounds. Many of the "favorable" attitudes in the Congress and in
the press were beclouded by a generalized and uncritical preference for "as is" multi-
lateral channels for the allocation and supervision of transfers of capital and human
resources from the United States to developing countries. On overall levels of aid,
and on channels preferable to those presently available, there were differences between
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direct the attention of minds or viscera, or preferably both, to contem-
porary, worldwide problems of inequality-most of which were probably
not seen as great challenges to world organization by Owen J. Roberts
or most others, including myself, in his time.
In general, the situation in the early postwar period, after the
United Nations came into being and formal colonialism was dying, was
not unlike the early "constitutional" state of the struggle of American
blacks to escape from inequality. In both cases, energies and hopes
were initially focused on making and applying great liberating norms-
of rules and legal structure. We did not then often have occasion to
relax from the effort and look ahead. Now the blacks' fight against
inequality shows new contours of complexity and challenge. We are
beyond the proper application of the old "rights." We grope for new
relationships, new sharings. So it is also with the challenges of in-
equality in the world community. In context, the excerpt at the head-
ing of this piece makes clear that the "frightful division" Justice Roberts
feared was "a division of ideologies, one or the other of which I think
must ultimately prevail." 7 It is not this division that seems so exclu-
sively threatening today. Man, to be sure, probably needs the stick as
well as the carrot to motivate him. In the earlier days of foreign as-
sistance the stick was fear of communism. Frenzy has receded as
experience and habituation have taken hold, but no other "gut drive"
has yet developed. It should not be hard to find, for the increasingly
sharp division of the world has already given us a clearly discernible
transnational parallel to the unstructured, highly irrational, violent con-
duct that troubles and threatens us at home. One has only to think of
nationalistic demagogues with nuclear bombs-small ones, of course,
filched from power reactor fuel-used somewhat as domestic terrorists
use chemical explosives today. Or, to parade another possible future,
think for a moment about the "mini-war" in Central America. It may
be the first population explosion war. Salvadorans, lacking land and
opportunities in their own overcrowded country, just went over the
border into emptier Honduras, where they were badly treated as aliens.
Their country responded. Result: irrational fighting and instability.
At this point I think of all the men in Mexico, behind the border wire
at Calexico, looking north, where there may be work; and I think of
twice their number in the not so distant future.
the viewpoints of the chairmen, respectively, of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations and the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. The chairmen of the
Inter-American Subcommittees of these committees also differed widely. Only
the unrelenting and tactically masterful opposition of the Honorable Otto E. Passman
to all types of foreign aid appropriations by the United States was, as always, fixed
and certain.
7 Roberts, .upra note 1, at 26.
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It would be impossible, without becoming maudlin, to cover even
by briefest reference the many transnational inequities that shock the
conscience. I shall deal with a selected group: those that I see as most
pregnant with danger for global well-being and the quality of life on
this planet. They are: (1) the organizational inequalities; (2). the
developmental inequalities; and (3) the nuclear inequalities.
I. ORGANIZATIONAL INEQUALITIES
By organizational inequalities I mean those inherent in existing
multinational organizations, such as the United Nations, as well as
those deriving from the schism between the richer, northern half and
the poorer, southern half of the world.
The vast differences in well-being between people in today's world
are organized into discrete legal-political packets: national states. A
major problem of our time is that the people who are struggling to
develop can be reached and involved in the process only through the
state which rules over them. And the state brings with it rigidities,
compartmentalizations, distortions, inefficiencies, and above all, addi-
tional inequalities that immensely hinder and complicate the develop-
ment process.
It has become trite to quote Orwell's grim parable about unequal
equality, but recollection of it is inescapable when we force ourselves to
face the vast differences between the assumptions about and the realities
of international organizations today. The tendency of many, even pro-
fessional observers, is to see the world of states in a way that would not
have startled Prince Metternich. Article two, paragraph one of the
United Nations Charter declares that "[t]he Organization is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." Twenty-five
articles later we come to the veto. Then we recall the somewhat less-
than-equal assumptions of "Big Three" world-control-for-peace under-
lying the Dumbarton Oaks proposal that went to San Francisco, where,
with one significant modification demanded by nonveto states,8 it be-
came the constitution of our basic, universal organization.
Today, instead of 51 members, the United Nations has 123. Prob-
lems completely unforeseen at its inception have arisen: polarizations,
mini-states, bloc voting in the General Assembly, greater use of the veto
in the Security Council, interminable oratory, floods of paper, loss of
effective leadership in the Secretariat. Expectations have declined
markedly as to how the United Nations can respond effectively to a
wide array of needs. I refer here to United Nations "proper," that is,
to the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Economic and Social
8 U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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Council, and, to the extent that it still has work to do, the Trusteeship
Council. Neither the veto system in the Security Council nor the "one
country, one vote" arrangement in the General Assembly and its related
councils seems any longer to assure mankind that through United
Nations deliberative processes new truth and new answers will come.
Instead of being a superior source of either commands or recommenda-
tions, the United Nations has largely become, at worst, a center for
confused, often highly emotive, jabbing at issues; at best, a medium for
the expression of values or decisions developed or reached through other
means. The United Nations Development Programme, which I shall
discuss later, deserves somewhat different conclusions.
The specialized and the autonomous worldwide agencies loosely
linked to the central core of the United Nations system vary in power
and authority, as well as in arrangements for national-state participation
through voting and membership on operating and governing councils
and committees.' The extent to which the tremendous enlargement of
United Nations membership has affected the operations, and the effects
of the operations, of each of these agencies is a function of the variables
just listed. Parts II and III herein will include analyses of the effects
of inequality, as organized into national-state patterns, on the utility and
the effectiveness of three of these agencies: the World Bank Group, the
International Monetary Fund, and the International Atomic Energy
Agency. In relationship to some but not all states, these three, es-
pecially the first two, come nearer than do other organizations to being
"deciding" rather than "service providing" institutions. It is, therefore,
within these agencies of the world community that the stresses and the
consequences of organized (national-state) inequalities are the most
challenging. It is significant that weighted voting in accordance with
quantity of investment is a characteristic of the decisionmaking process
of the World Bank and the Monetary Fund, and that the International
Atomic Energy Agency is not in substantial control of the sources of
supply of special nuclear materials.
Today we view international organizations differently than we did
in 1945. The world has followed in the intervening twenty-five years
two patterns of modifying the nation-state system. One, the pattern
just discussed, is fully structured. The other is thus far only partially
structured, and often only dimly perceived. It is the pattern of regional
groupings of peoples through various types of associations between the
states into which people continue to be organized.
These groupings are not necessarily classifiable as "regional ar-
rangements" under Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter.
9 For a useful descriptive survey and collection of basic organic acts, see
W. FRIEIMxANN, 0. LissiTZyw, & R PUGH, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1008-101 (1969).
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Regional associations with which the Charter is concerned are essen-
tially directed toward collective security; as such they characteristically
include member states that vary widely as to existing power and related
capabilities. A good example of a United Nations "regional arrange-
ment" is the inter-American security system, 0 based upon the Inter-
American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty), some of
the mechanisms of the Organization of American States, and the pre-
ponderant hemispheric military power of the United States. These
arrangements have their utilities, without doubt; and the institutions
that cluster around the central purpose of their being are adaptable to
other needs: witness, for example, the involvement of the Organization
of American States in development-related activities.
But beyond security-seeking regional arrangements we find new
trends toward enlarging the size of the "service-control" area-the area
in which an institution is significant. The world's most developed
example of this is the European Economic Community (EEC). Origi-
nally, this grouping was seen as one that, beginning with the creation
of a wider spatial ambit for economic operations, would evolve rapidly
toward a common defense structure and culminate in a political asso-
ciation of a generally federalist pattern.
Although discernible United States attitudes toward regional ar-
rangements elsewhere than in Western Europe have shifted over time,"
unification there has been something of an American dream for quite a
long time. From 1948 on, Western European regionalism was sup-
ported here for almost all the reasons prompting United States interest
in that region: as security in the cold war context, as an instrumentality
for economic reconstruction, and as an aid in redressing the new politi-
cal inequality caused by the rise among states of two superpowers.
While not all Marshall Plan money went to those European countries
now integrated in a common market, that remarkable outpouring, peak-
ing from 1949 through 1954 and ending within a decade, did go to a
group of countries that for economic reconstruction and development
organized themselves into an Office of European Economic Cooperation
(OEEC). This regional institution fixed priorities, planned recon-
struction, and distributed on a regional basis 13.4 billion dollars in
United States grants and 1.9 billion in loans."2
10 Id. 960-65; cf. C. OLIVER, THE INTER-AmERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM AND THE
CUBAN CRISIS (1964).
- See Nye, United States Policy Toward Regional Organization, 23 INT'L
ORGANIZATION 719 (1969).
12 STATISTICS & REPORTS DIVISION, OFFICE OF PROGRAM & POLICY COORDINATION,
AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
ADMINISTERED BY THE AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND PREDECESSOR
AGENCIES: APRIL 3, 1948-JUNE 30, 1968, at 67 (table, "Europe-Total") (1969) [here-
inafter cited as USAID SUMMARY].
CHALLENGES OF INEQUALITY
In the OEEC the United States was an observer, not a voter.
Moreover, in support of European unification, the United States modi-
fied its attachment to unconditional most-favored-nation treatment so as
to encourage communitywide free trade. It was foreseen at the time
that the wider opportunities and greater well-being such a common
market would give to the roughly 225,000,000 people of Western
Europe would also cost the United States its most-favored-nation trad-
ing rights with each member state. Perhaps not so clearly foreseen was
that the new grouping would in time eliminate more inequalities than
we had expected, such as those implied by our vague dream-not yet
ended-of an Atlantic regional grouping within which we, without any
identifiable loss of "sovereignty," would to some unspecified extent be-
come one among several.' 3
The new grouping in Europe has not achieved the displacement of
existing states or very much supranationality. But through it relative
inequality between the peoples living under this system and those living
in the United States has been markedly reduced. The adjustments
made within the EEC as to voting, the shift of certain essentially execu-
tive powers to new transnational institutions of experts, the slowly
increasing participation in selection of goals by the people-representing
assembly, and even the apparent outcome of President de Gaulle's effort
to return power to the capitals of the member countries,'14 stand as sign-
posts along a road that others may follow.
It is equally important to notice the effects of this experience with
regionalism on the poorer parts of the world. So far, conventional and
developmental foreign policy of the Six vis-h-vis the poor nations is
almost exclusively national rather than regional. So far there is almost
nothing in events to suggest that EEC responses in such formal insti-
tutions as the United Nations might be coordinated and unified through
the regional structure. There is little evidence, moreover, that Latin
Americans and Afro-Asians presently use regional instrumentalities for
such purposes.
The economic success of regionalized Western Europe has accen-
tuated a newly perceived, deeply divisive dichotomy: the affluent north-
ern half versus the poverty-ridden southern half of "Spaceship Earth."
By granting trade preferences to developing countries which are asso-
ciated with member countries, Western Europe has created a discrimi-
nation in its treatment of different poor regions. Another economic
13 The halcyon days of the "Grand Design" for an Atlantic Community aligmnent
were roughly 1957-63. The new nationalism of General de Gaulle marked the abate-
ment, if not the end, of this expectancy that there would be a new Atlantic regionalism
among the developed nations of the West.
14See J. NEWHOUSE, COLLISION IN BRussELs: THE CRisis OF JUNE 30 (Tocque-
ville Series No. 2, 1967).
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success story (at least in total productivity terms) is that of the Soviet
Union and its dominated Eastern European associates. But, because of
Soviet dominance, its decisions to stay outside the major multinational
institutions for development, and the rather enigmatic character of its
foreign assistance, the Eastern European regional arrangement seems to
enjoy today the "psycho-political" advantages of being thought outside
the rich world while actually in it. Japan is a special case. So far it
has not concentrated its assistance efforts in any one of the three major
poverty areas of the world (sub-Sahara Africa, South and Southeast
Asia, and Latin America), although probably it will before long.
The north-south division of the world is seen perhaps most sharply
in connection with the United Nations Commission for Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), where the majority of members are poor
countries that see in the markets of the affluent, closed to them by tariffs
and quotas or by their own higher costs, solutions to many of their
problems of low national income and tragically high unemployment.
One response of the rich European countries has been limited rather
than general trade preferences. Through UNCTAD and other instru-
mentalities, the United States is fighting for Latin America the battle
for generalized (that is, nondiscriminatory) trade preferences, to date
without tangible positive results. The United States has implied that,
if not successful in this effort, it may once again compromise the un-
conditional most-favored-nation principle, this time to limit preferences
in its markets to those developing countries denied preferences elsewhere
in the developed world.
Another organizationally oriented response to the concern of the
developing world about its ability to earn and grow by profiting in the
markets of the rich is for the developed countries to urge the poor
countries to accept capital and technical assistance for the creation of
new trading areas made up of their own national market territories.
After early reluctance to support initial Latin American activities along
these lines, the United States became in the Kennedy-Johnson years a
strong, even insistent, supporter of regionwide market areas.' 5 Devel-
oping-country "common markets" have been associated, not unnaturally,
with the preferment of the regional agencies for coordination and plan-
ning of developmental aid. These two organizational aspects of de-
velopment are not inseparably linked, however; and it may be that
emerging official attitudes in this country, already committed to the
latter, may not as strongly support the former.' 6
1-5 This culminated in the Western Hemisphere summit meeting of the presidents
at Punta del Este, Uruguay, in April 1967. Cf. Oliver, Physical Integration and the
Future of Latin America, 36 SociAL RESEFARCH 253 (1969).
16 Almost complete silence on regional market integration in the developing
Americas has characterized official utterances of the Nixon administration on inter-
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To summarize, almost all the seventy-odd new states that have
come into existence after the United Nations began to function have
entered the world community under severe conditions of de facto in-
equality. Through these inexperienced but sovereign instrumentalities
and their counterparts among older states in the poor world, larger and
larger numbers of disadvantaged people grope for improvement in their
condition. In seeking help for their constituencies, the poor states deal
with affluent states, either directly or through highly structured inter-
national organizations in which the rich states have many advantages of
decisionmaking. Meanwhile, outside the formal structure of the United
Nations, a successful regional effort in economic rehabilitation was car-
ried out, largely through the exercise of group decisionmaking by grant
beneficiaries. Although the success of this regional effort has itself
sharpened the division of the world into rich nations and poor nations,
it may become the model for development-related regionalism elsewhere.
Whether it will depends to a considerable extent upon what the true
situation is as to inequalities-and the effects thereof-specifically re-
lated to the development process. To this I now turn.
II. DEVELOPMENTAL INEQUALITIES
A fundamental developmental inequality, one that deeply challenges
all organizational arrangements, is that developing countries are vastly
unequal among themselves. The Pearson Report, assuming that less
than $500 annual income per person is the unambiguous criterion of a
"developing country," notes that by this standard there are more than
100 developing countries, containing about two-thirds of the world's
population at the present time.' These countries vary tremendously in
area, total population, density of population, rate of population growth,
natural resources, industrialization, trade, government, and cultural
patterns.
It is hard even for experts to keep these significant differences in
mind. When I began to represent the United States at the World Bank,
I looked for the first time at the World Bank Atlas.:' On one map
therein, the states of the world are given a size related to their popula-
tions rather than their areas. These countries are shaded from a deep
American policy. This may result from an assumption under the "low profile doc-
trine" that the matter is no longer suitable for United States-Latin dialogue until
revived by the latter. Or it may mark a new estimate that the market-integration
movements have slipped so badly as to have become hopeless.
17 PEARSON REPORT 23.
I
8
INFOPATION & PUBLIC AFFAIRS DEP'T, INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECON-
STRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT (WORLD BANK), WORLD BANK ATLAs (updated periodi-
cally). Many of its charts are also published in FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, a quarterly
publication of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank group. The map
I refer to is carried in FINANCE & DEVELOPMENT, Mar. 1969, at 30-41.
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green for the very rich, those with a gross national product (GNP)
per head of over $1200, to a light tan for the very poor, those with a
GNP per capita of less than $100 a year. The light tan areas are vast,
including mainland China, India, Pakistan, Indonesia, North Vietnam,
Burma, Nepal, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Kenya, and
the Malagasy Republic. For me, just out of the Alliance for Progress
fight against poverty in the Western Hemisphere, the first startling
lesson from this map was that there is only one, relatively small, spot
of tan in the Americas: Haiti.
In all of Africa only South Africa, Libya, and French Somaliland
produce $500 or more per person. In Asia only Japan, Hong Kong,
Singapore, Kuwait, and Brunei reach or exceed that figure. In Oceania
those countries that have "made it" to development are Australia, New
Zealand, New Caledonia, French Polynesia, Guam, and American
Samoa. In the Western Hemisphere the developed political units are
the United States, Canada, Puerto Rico, Panama, Trinidad-Tobago,
Martinique, Netherlands Antilles, Virgin Islands, Argentina, Ven-
ezuela, Chile, Uruguay, and French Guiana. In all of Europe, includ-
ing the U.S.S.R., only three out of thirty countries are below $500
per head.
Excluding special cases, such as oil-rich sheikdoms, tourist havens,
and associated areas not states, fourteen European countries are among
the very rich, along with the United States, Canada, Israel (almost),
Australia, and New Zealand. There is not a single very rich black
country on the planet. Japan will be found in the "club" in the next
firm statistics, becoming the first Asian rich country. No other Asian
country is even close.
Brazil, one of the world's largest states in area and over 80,000,000
in population-the single most significant country in the Western Hemi-
sphere after the United States-has a GNP per head of $240, less than
that of Albania, Turkey, and Portugal, the poorest countries in Europe.
Yet along with Mexico and Argentina, Brazil is one of the three "ad-
vanced export countries" of Latin America, and as such creates special
problems for the other developing American countries as to freer trade
among them all through regional market arrangements.
Actually, as anyone from the affluent world who has lived in or
closely observed developing countries knows, the statistics given above
gloss over harsh reality. Putting aside both factual errors and doctrinal
disputes about the components of the measure, GNP--or, more accu-
rately, gross domestic product (GDP)-masks vast inequities in the
actual distribution of benefits and opportunities within most societies.
We do not have, alas, a developed methodology for the comparative
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measurement of "fairness-in-sharing" of GNP or GDP. Brief exami-
nation tells us that the very rich countries by the GNP-GDP standard
are either participatory democracies or ideologically egalitarian states
in which alterations in patterns of resource enjoyment are fiscally pos-
sible if politics or dogma should so require. In the poorer countries,
however, the fiscal possibilities are much more restricted, and frequently
brake social changes even if they are otherwise politically acceptable.
Conventional Wisdom about the development process-one of the
major disruptive inequalities viewed from the "people" standpoint-
declares that the only business of development is economic development;
that is, the augmentation of the total production of goods and services
for export, consumption, and savings. In classic doctrine, better con-
ditions of life within the nation will come inevitably-if slowly-by
trickling down from increases in GNP-GDP. The parallels between
this harsh and unrealistic doctrine and certain discredited notions of
domestic economic inevitability held in this country from time to time
seem very striking to me.
Now there is no avoiding the fact that a country has to have some-
thing worth dividing more equitably before it is worthwhile trying to
divide it. Therefore, economic development is essential and paramount.
Also, the development process is traumatic for those going through it,
and inevitably a very large part of the necessary abstention from con-
sumption-even where less than $100 per capita per year is available-
must fall on the masses. But "trickle-down" will not do as a develop-
ment philosophy. It seems essential that economic and social develop-
ment go hand-in-hand, rather than for the latter to be ignored or de-
ferred-or go unplanned-until the former is accomplished. Lack of
planned social development resulted in frustrating and corrosive dilem-
mas for too many developing countries; for those, for example, which
ignored agriculture and industrialized, using the most modern, labor-
sparing machinery in lands of very low employment to manufacture
goods not really competitive with those of developed countries. This
is the route of the prestige national airline, the military telecommunica-
tions system, and too many "impact projects."
Nowhere does failure to ignore the "people inequality" problem in
the development process seem to me more dangerous and inadequate
than in contemporary authoritative declarations and recent studies
which implicitly revive the trickle-down approach. Outmoded attitudes
resurface: (1) "Trade, not aid." (2) "Foreign private investment is
the key." (3) "Multilateral bank lending is best."
First: People in developing countries, even if illiterate, are cannier
-or more cynical-than some politicians of developed countries believe.
1970]
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They want to know what the new total assistance input patterns will
look like: will they increase, as they should, or decrease behind cover
of clich6? What is the implication, they must wonder, of a United
States resurvey of foreign assistance (the Peterson Report)19 that does
not care to make any recommendation as to the total United States
foreign aid contribution in terms of some fraction of one percent of the
United States GNP, especially when figures in the upper one-half of
the one percent range have recently been spoken of with approval by
the United Nations Development Program and the Pearson Report?
Developing countries should make more from their exports. The
real challenge to their making more from their exports is, in general,
price. Tariffs and quantitative restrictions are often secondary dis-
advantages. Price subvention paid by consumers in developed countries
would be the most difficult kind of foreign assistance to obtain that I
can think of. And it would be a poor form of assistance from the people
standpoint (the traders in developing countries are not infrequently
oligarchs), unless the concession-givers could negotiate for equitable
people-use of the new benefits received by the concession-getters. So
far, this type of trade negotiation is unknown to economic diplomacy,
although I think it ought to be tried-but not as a cure-all or substitute
for development assistance.
Second: It is very dangerous, perhaps even tragic, that at a time
when awareness of developing-country "hang-ups" should be receiving
increased attention there is so much bland disregard in developed coun-
tries of the intense anxieties of people in developing countries about
permanent, proprietary foreign ownership. Foreign investment from
the private sector creates capital inflow (less repatriations of earnings
and earlier investment), and can have a significant modernizing effect
on business methods and marketing. It has a place and a future, pro-
vided it is not made to carry a development load it cannot manage. It
would not, under the best of conditions, justify taking a single dollar
out of already too low public assistance packages for the under $500 a
year per capita countries.
Third: Purely multilateral foreign assistance has nothing against
it, except the simple fact that there are no worldwide, or even regional,
full-range 2 development agencies. A development bank is not the same
19 PRESIDENTIAL TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, U.S. FOREIGN
ASSISTANCE IN THE 1970s: A NEW APPROACH 4, 26-36 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
PErERsoN REPORT].
20 1 use this term to denote a development assistance agency that is authorized
and has funded capabilities to provide technical assistance, supporting assistance,
and all types of development grants and loans. As to development loans it should
be empowered to make program (general balance of payments) as well as project
(the funding of discrete construction, such as a hydroelectric power plant or a
railway) loans. It should also have the legal ability to make sector loans-
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as a development agency. USAID is the only "full-range development
agency" in the world. Multilateralization proposals frequently refer to
the World Bank Group, which comprises the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Develop-
ment Association (IDA), and two other institutions helpful in the de-
velopment process but not at issue here. There are definite limitations
upon what the World Bank can do, however, although its current presi-
dent has in several key speeches " urged the Bank Group to move beyond
its traditional, self-sought role of providing loans for national infra-
structural capital purposes.
The limitations on the World Bank proper (IBRD) arise from:
(1) psychological constraints related to the securities market for World
Bank bonds, (2) traditional viewpoints on the part of some of its staff
and management, (3) lack of contemporary development assistance
experience on the part of certain of its executive directors voting the
weighted shares of the developed countries, and (4) backstopping of
executive directors by finance ministries, rather than development min-
istries, within member governments. The above limitations relate to
and reinforce the expectation of the financial community of the devel-
oped world that World Bank loan proposals should always be capable
of credible quantification, and that as quantified they will convincingly
show, by incremental or cost-benefit analysis, that the borrower can
repay and improve developmentally in the process. President Mc-
Namara's calls for expansion of Bank Group activities into education,
population, agriculture, urbanization, employment, and industrialization
give assurance that top management expects to lead the Bank out of its
earlier concentration on railways, telephone systems, roads, and other
basic sinews of growth. The first three of these proposed new activities,
however, are inherently difficult to quantify. The other three may pre-
loans to the foreign exchange resources of a developing country for the improvement
of a defined sector, such as primary education, the local currency generated thereby
also to be used for local currency costs in the same sector. Also, a full-range de-
velopment agency should have the power to make concessional loans-loans provided
on terms of repayment below the cost to the lender of the money loaned. No inter-
national assistance agency presently in existence has all these capabilities. The
United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has them all, plus
investment guarantees and feasibility studies for the private sector. No other de-
veloped-country national assistance agency has the array of authorized and funded
capabilities of USAID.
21 Addresses by Robert S. McNamara, President, World Bank Group, to the Board
of Governors, Sept. 30, 1968 & Sept. 29, 1969 (available in pamphlet form from the
Bank). In the 1968 report Mr. McNamara called for quantitative improvement by
expansion of the Bank Group's operations, and for qualitative improvement by Bank
Group entry into lending operations relating to education, agriculture, and population.
In his 1969 statement Mr. McNamara recapitulated the course he had proposed
the year before, reported achievement of the quantitative expansion, reiterated the
new qualitative program, and proposed that to it there be added inputs related
to unemployment, urbanization, and industrialization. See also INTERNATIONAL BANK,
FOR REcONSTRUcTION & DEvELOPmENT (WORLD BANK) & INnmRNATIoNAL DEvEJop-
MENT Ass'N, ANUAL REPORT 1969, at 10-11, 18 (1969).
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sent serious measurement problems should projects falling thereunder
be essentially social. It remains to be seen whether the member govern-
ments from the rich world will instruct their executive directors to go
along where cost-benefit is not clearly demonstrable.
Even should lending criteria be relaxed, the IBRD still has to lend
at rates within the range of what money costs it, and on fairly tight
grace and repayment schedules. The IDA, however, provides credits
that are highly concessional (fifty-year repayment period; ten-year
grace; three-quarters of one percent service charge, but no interest).
Thus IDA could be an international development agency in the true
sense; ' but it is not yet, because the expectations of a number of the
developed member states lead to as rigorous appraisal of the quantifi-
able success-capability of IDA loans as of IBRD loans. The going rule
is that the only difference between an IDA loan and an IBRD loan is
that IDA borrowers are the countries that foreseeably do not have the
foreign exchange capability of repaying on the more difficult IBRD
terms. Until IDA breaks from IBRD lending criteria of the sort just
mentioned, and until it is financed adequately to be able to lend to coun-
tries in the very lowest poverty class,3 it is not going to be the full-
range development agency that Mr. McNamara's program needs.
The difficulties just analyzed are often ignored when a shift to a
mainly multilateral lending approach is advocated. Again, the problem
has a domestic parallel: what shall be the decisionmaking role of the
poor here in connection with their improvement? The international
issue is quiescent but present in the current operations of the World
Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The de-
veloping-country representatives are in very weak voting positions in
these institutions.2 4  Probably the only factor that has prevented ten-
sions from breaking through more often to disturb the calm correctness
of board meetings in both institutions is that the role of the executive
directors, as contrasted with that of staff and management, is to ap-
prove or disapprove, not to initiate. From my experience in Bank
Group-IMF circles, however, I know that the strains are there. They
will get worse, especially if developing-country voting power is further
reduced as a result of new capitalizations in which they cannot partici-
22 See note 20 supra.
2
3GNP of $100 or less per person.
24 In the IBRD, the American voting share is 24.87%; the United States and
other developed countries together have about 70% of the total voting power therein. In
the IDA, International Finance Corporation (IFC), and IMF the actual strengths vary
slightly, but not significantly, from the IBRD pattern. At the present, executive
directors from less well-developed countries are fearful that their already slight
representation may be further reduced as new programs are once again heavily
subscribed by the rich countries, with only token subscription by the developing
countries.
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pate. Developing-country inequalities seem especially noticeable in the
Fund, because although its writ runs to the monetary policies of all
member countries, rich and poor alike, its reserve-parity prescriptions
actually are written mainly for the weaker countries, and hardly ever
for the very rich countries-especially those whose currencies have be-
come reserve currencies. 5
Yet both these major, universal institutions, the Bank and the
Fund, are clearly development-oriented at the management level and
admirably staffed for sound, useful technical assistance to, or direction
of, many aspects of development. But if the United States goes ahead
with proposals to put more and more of its development assistance into
multilateral channels, not only will the multilateral agencies themselves
have to be modified, but the institutional sources within the United
States Government of strong-voiced instruction to, or oversight of,
those who vote the big shares of the United States ought to be reex-
amined. Let me be frank: development, especially social or "people"
development, is not a major mission of the United States Treasury
Department, nor of the Federal Reserve Governors. They have other
responsibilities. I trust that if the recommendation of the Peterson
Report2 to Balkanize USAID goes into effect, at least the new United
States International Development Council proposed by Peterson's group
for high-level supervision of the contemplated scattering of United
States assistance decisionmaking power will also backstop the World
Bank Group. The power should go where the development sense-of-
mission is.
There remain for appraisal three other aspects of developing-
country participation in the development process: regional lending
agencies and their affiliates, structured like the World Bank Group; the
United Nations Development Programme; and developing-area counter-
parts of the OEEC of Marshall Plan days.
The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the Asian
Development Bank (ADB) have "hard" and "soft" lending capabilities.
In the IDB, the only fully-developed country member, the United States,
has an overwhelmingly preponderant vote, especially on "soft" loans.
In actual operations, it is very gingerly used; the IDB itself has from
the beginning claimed-and has achieved-a "Latin character." I am
satisfied from my examination of its loan policy statements and of the
loan roster that the IDB has gone considerably farther, especially
through its "softer" loan avenues, than has the IBRD-IDA in giving
2 5 A statement based upon observations by the writer while a development-
concerned official of the United States Government and corroborated by a number of
monetary economists.
2 6 PEERSON REPORT 4, 26-36.
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loan assistance to relatively less quantifiable, essentially social, projects.
The ADB is in the first years of its operation; and it, too, is marked by
some concentration of voting power in the developed-country members,
of which a key one is Japan. It is too early in the operating life of the
ADB for impressions as to developmental priorities and outlooks be-
tween its developed and its developing members.
African regional institutions, including the Organization of African
Unity, do not, de jure, include developed-country participation. As
such they may represent a significant trend related to a general theme
of this paper. So far, however, there is little to report, except in rela-
tionship to the IBRD-IDA "atmospherics" of polarization discussed
previously. But the attitudes of the African, Asian, and Latin American
regions of development towards the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP) do require brief attention.
The UNDP, on the face of it, would seem to suffer from the im-
passe of formal equality (one country, one vote) that plagues the
General Assembly and its associated organs. The UNDP is hierarchi-
cally under the Economic and Social Council, and its governing council
is evenly divided between developed and developing members. Actually,
because of the vitality and developmental skills of its managing director
and staff, the UNDP seems to parallel in practice the allocation of
authority between truly international management and national repre-
sentational elements that we have seen in the World Bank Group and
the IMF. Unfortunately, polarization between the developed and the
developing countries is now also discernible in the UNDP. One sign
of this is seen from a statement in A Study of the Capacity of the
United Nations Development System (the "Jackson Report") : 7
[I]n 1966, the developing countries, feeling even more
sharply the deficiencies of both bilateral and United Nations
systems of aiding their development, finally used their voting
strength in the UN General Assembly to force through the
Capital Development Fund .... But the pledging con-
ference was largely boycotted by the developed countries
Three years later, pledged contributions to the Fund still
totalled only US$2.6 million, of which no more than US
$128,000 had been actually paid in by 3 June 1969?2
Other divisions of viewpoint have developed during UNDP con-
sideration of the Jackson Report itself, particularly as to its rather
favorable view of the World Bank Group's role as presently played and
27 U.N. Doc. DP/5 (1969) (2 volumes combined).
2 8 Id. vol. 2, at 17.
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its effort to give greater emphasis to agriculture and less to in-
dustrialization.29 The developing country members of the governing
council of the UNDP have their doubts about the first of these points
and only reluctantly accept the second. Only a few months ago, in
January of this year, a "confrontation crisis" of sorts occurred, and
harmony has not yet been entirely restored.
These problems in existing broad-based international organiza-
tions for development have induced some to look to new, regional forms
of association as better instrumentalities for meeting the resentments,
inhibitions, and other difficulties resulting from the inequalities between
the participating nations in broad-based international organizations.
In addition, regional common market or trading arrangements have
their logical, as well as psychological, contributions to make. Regional
structures for planning and allocation of foreign assistance, and for
review of national performance as to developmental courses of action
undertaken, have very clear attractiveness.
The Latin American countries of the Western Hemisphere are
in the vanguard here. With recognition of the important contributions
made by studies of the Asian prospects,3" let us focus now on Latin
American events. Latin American group efforts toward development
began without United States involvement or significant assistance.
The USAID summary of American external assistance contains, for
Latin America during the Marshall Plan years, the entry "No PRO-
GRAMS PRIOR To FY 1952." In fiscal year 1953, while Europe was
getting one and one-quarter billion dollars, Latin America got twenty-
one million. It was not until fiscal year 1959 that total loans and
grants to all of Latin America rose over one hundred million dollars.
Total assistance of something slightly less than one-half billion dollars
was not reached until fiscal year 1962."'
Beginning through the United Nations, especially its Economic
Commission for Latin America, the Latin Americans were meanwhile
formulating the goals of what, when in 1961 the United States finally
came into institutionalized developmental relationships in the hem-
isphere, was given the name "Alliance for Progress." From the
beginning the United States-Latin American program sought a col-
lective approach to the planning of development, first through the
group called the "Nine Wise Men," and eventually through the Inter-
American Commission of the Alliance for Progress, known in all
9 Received informally from knowledgeable sources.
30 1 am especially indebted to Arthur Paul for his personal instruction about
regionalism in Asia. See A. PAU.L, REiONAUiSm IN ASIA: A NEw THRUST FOR DE-
VELOPMENT (Asia Foundation Occasional Paper No. 1, 1968); Paul, The Key to
Asian Regionalisn, SoL DmY,, Jan. 1969.31 USAID SuMMARY 25 (table, "Latin America-Total").
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languages by its acronym in Spanish, CIAP. Juridically CIAP is a
limited-membership subinstitution of the Organization of American
States (OAS), closely linked to the Economic and Social Council
thereof, whose members, including the United States' representatives,
represent their professional judgments rather than their governments.
The assistance policy of the United States in the Johnson adminis-
tration was to transfer to CIAP more and more decisionmaking power
about American assistance. The Nixon administration continued this
policy but, within a relatively short time after it took office, Latin
American consensus showed a preference for new arrangements featur-
ing representation of only the developing countries at the level of for-
mulation of common policy and area goals and the maintenance of the
assistance relationship with the United States through the OAS.
Hints of this trend were seen earlier, when the Latin Americans
showed reluctance to admit the United States to their negotiations
on economic integration. 2
The instrumentality chosen by the Latin Americans for the
formulation of their new consensus is called the Special Committee for
Latin American Coordination (CECLA, in the sole, Spanish acronym).
Its institutional history, with a long gap, goes back to the period of
pre-United States involvement in Western Hemisphere development;
but its revival is significantly related, in my opinion, to the theme of
this lecture. CECLA and its output, the consensus of Vina del Mar,3
relate to the United States through the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council of the OAS. The CECLA consensus is clear evidence
that the developing countries of the Western Hemisphere are seeking
strength in unity in their dealings with the major external supplier (so
far) of support to the development process in this hemisphere. This is
a very important step. Although this first CECLA consensus is some-
what less scientific, and certainly less diplomatic, than CIAP reports
have been-resembling somewhat, especially in the manner of its
presentation to President Nixon, the politics of confrontation-it is a
revealing document. CECLA's rise and role deserve careful attention;
CECLA ought to be, and perhaps is being, nurtured by thoroughgoing
acceptance by the United States. CECLA also merits careful attention
32 The reference is to meetings held at the ministerial level in 1967. These
followed the June meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at
Vina del Mar, Chile, itself a "follow-up' to the Western Hemisphere summit, note 15
supra. The summit meeting had established a timetable for integration between the
Latin American Free Trade Association and the Central Common Market; the
President of the United States had assured the Latins of United States adjustment
assistance, despite the refusal of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to support
a requested presummit sense-of-the-Congress resolution committing the United States
to such support.
3 O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser. H/X.14/CIES/1403, at 5-20 app. I (1969).
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elsewhere in the developing world; it may be a major response to the
challenge of inequality in developmentY4
III. NUCLEAR INEQUALITIES
It is irrelevant to choose on a scale of awfulness between an ever
more crowded and environmentally degraded planet, riven by un-
relieved people inequalities, and an earth dotted by fission-type atomic
power plants and covert arsenals of nuclear weapons (or the in-
gredients for their manufacture). Just recently, after much effort
and anguish, the Non-Proliferation Treaty " came into effect for some
but not all states. The Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 3' has had
discernible effects on atmospheric testing, and the nuclear weapons
limitations talks (SALT) are about to enter a second phase. Perhaps
one should merely speak well of the men of good will who have tried
so hard to give mankind control of the atom, hail their achievements,
pause briefly to lament the failure of an early American proposal to
internationalize all aspects of atomic power, and hope for the best or
resign oneself to fate, depending on one's nature. But I cannot in
conscience do this, especially in this symposium-over-time, the Roberts
Memorial Lectures, because I have come to believe firmly that absolute
inequality (some have all; most, nothing) between peoples is inevitably
unstable. The atomic inequality is absolute under the Non-Prolifera-
tion Treaty, even taking into account the role and authority of the
International Atomic Energy Agency, and all other international
organizations and rules.
Absolute inequality as defined above always exists where the
Have Nots are dependent upon the mere good will, generosity, or
even the legal promises, of the Haves. It is obvious that this is the
situation as to nuclear energy. The only potential equals to the Haves
are those states that have refused to become bound to the existing
nuclear conventions on testing and nonproliferation-or those that
341 regret that M. wETZloNi, THE MAJORITY OF ONE: TOWARDS A THEORY OF
REGIONAL ComPATA.ILITY (1970), came off the presses too late to help me in the
preparation of this Article. It is promising as to methodology and outlook. Chapters
in I THE FuTuRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (C. Black & R. Falk eds.
1969), are also relevant. Some exceptionally fine work on the prospects for new
regionalism is now being done by the Panel on Regionalism, American Society of
International Law, under the direction of Professor Stephan A. Riesenfeld, who
himself has already contributed two outstanding studies, tentatively being held
for publication, to a Society compendium.
35 Pending printing of the treaty in the United Nations Treaty Series, its textmay be found in AMERICAIN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 7 INTERN ATIOqA.L LEGALmATERIALS, No. 3, at 564 (1968). The treaty is profitably compared with Conf. of
Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, Final Report, 23 U.N. GAOR U.N. Doc. A/7277 (1968),
especially the Declaration of the Conference, id. 1719, and particularly 5, expressingsupport for nuclear-weapon-free zones.
36 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and
Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, [1963] 2 U.S.T. 1313, T.I.A.S. No. 5433, 480 U.N.T.S. 43.
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might later break them. Worse, the de facto inequalities apply not
only to weapons, but also to atomic fuel for the present fission-type
power plants.
In other instances, inequalities in goods, services, and the quality
of life can be reduced by creating new rights guaranteeing more
equitable sharing. But the reduction of the nuclear inequality by this
means is impossible. The nuclear inequality is not basically a scarcity
inequality; it is an inequality based on the fear to share. If not erased,
this inequality will be as corrosive and as conducive to redress by
evasive or demagogic means as any other type of inequality between
peoples.
But how to erase it? Only by universal, supranational control, or
by absolute eradication of all nuclear advantages. Regionalism holds
no promise here. There is no solution within the present nation-
state system. This we must face. Here, then, should be fastened the
minds and spirits of all of those who see things as they are, but who
have not lost that most basic quality of life itself, the urge and the
struggle to respond even to the most dire challenges. The unequal
atom, peaceful 37 as well as bellicose, has become intolerable.
37 Power from fusion reactors when available will not, it is said, present problems
of radioactive contamination of air, land, and water or problems of waste disposal.
As to the likelihood that the environmental threats of fission reactors have been
seriously understated, see Hines, Boost in Atomic Fuel Plants Increases Radiation
Threat, Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 21, 1970, at 37, cols. 3-5, stressing the conclu-
sions of Drs. Gofman and Tamplin, who, though engaged by the Atomic Energy
Commission, elected to report their alarming findings in November 1969, to a
Senate Public Works Subcommittee. These scientists focused on levels of radio-
activity. Other environmentalists have called attention to the dangers to ecological
balance in semiclosed waters, such as Chesapeake Bay, that will follow increases
in water temperature resulting from cooling of fission-type power plants now under
construction.
